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Abstract
In this paper, we study the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel.
The degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel consists of two groups of users
and a group of eavesdroppers, where, if we pick an arbitrary user from each group of
users and an arbitrary eavesdropper, they satisfy a certain Markov chain. We study
two different communication scenarios for this channel. In the first scenario, the trans-
mitter wants to send a confidential message to users in the first (stronger) group and
a different confidential message to users in the second (weaker) group, where both
messages need to be kept confidential from the eavesdroppers. For this scenario, we
assume that there is only one eavesdropper. We obtain the secrecy capacity region
for the general discrete memoryless channel model, the parallel channel model, and
the Gaussian parallel channel model. For the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output
(MIMO) channel model, we obtain the secrecy capacity region when there is only one
user in the second group. In the second scenario we study, the transmitter sends a
confidential message to users in the first group which needs to be kept confidential
from the second group of users and the eavesdroppers. Furthermore, the transmitter
sends a different confidential message to users in the second group which needs to be
kept confidential only from the eavesdroppers. For this scenario, we do not put any
restriction on the number of eavesdroppers. As in the first scenario, we obtain the
secrecy capacity region for the general discrete memoryless channel model, the parallel
channel model, and the Gaussian parallel channel model. For the Gaussian MIMO
channel model, we establish the secrecy capacity region when there is only one user in
the second group.
∗This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 04-47613, CCF 05-14846, CNS 07-16311 and CCF 07-
29127, and presented in part at the 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communications, Control and
Computing, Monticello, IL, September 2009.
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1 Introduction
Information theoretic secrecy was initiated by Wyner in his seminal work [1], where he con-
sidered the degraded wiretap channel and established the capacity-equivocation rate region
of this degraded channel model. Later, Csiszar and Korner generalized his result to arbitrary,
not necessarily degraded, wiretap channels in [2]. In recent years, multi-user versions of the
wiretap channel have attracted a considerable amount of research interest; see for example
references [3-21] in [3]. Among all these extensions, two natural extensions of the wiretap
channel to the multi-user setting are particularly of interest here: secure broadcasting and
compound wiretap channels.
Secure broadcasting refers to the situation where a transmitter wants to communicate
with several legitimate receivers confidentially in the presence of an external eavesdropper.
We call this channel model the multi-receiver wiretap channel. Since the underlying channel
model without an eavesdropper is the broadcast channel, which is not understood to the full
extent even for the two-user case, most works on secure broadcasting have focused on some
special classes of multi-receiver wiretap channels, where these classes are identified by certain
degradation orders [4–8]. In particular, [5–7] consider the degraded multi-receiver wiretap
channel, where observations of all users and the eavesdropper satisfy a certain Markov chain.
In [5], the secrecy capacity region is derived for the two-user case, and in [6, 7], the secrecy
capacity region is established for an arbitrary number of legitimate users. The importance of
this result lies in the facts that the Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel belongs to this
class, and the secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel serves
as a crucial step in establishing the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian multiple-input
multiple-output (MIMO) multi-receiver wiretap channel [3], though the latter channel is not
necessarily degraded. In [3], besides proving the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian
MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, we also present new optimization results regarding
extremal properties of Gaussian random vectors, which we generalize here.
Another extension of the wiretap channel that we are particularly interested in here, is
the compound wiretap channel. In compound wiretap channels, there are a finite number of
channel states determining the channel transition probability. The channel takes a certain
fixed state for the entire duration of the transmission, and the transmitter does not have
any knowledge about the channel state realization. Thus, the aim of the transmitter is to
ensure the secrecy of messages irrespective of the channel state realization. In addition to
this definition, the compound wiretap channel admits another interpretation. Consider the
multi-receiver wiretap channel with several legitimate users and many eavesdroppers, where
the transmitter wants to transmit a common confidential message to legitimate users while
keeping all of the eavesdroppers totally ignorant of the message. Since each eavesdropper and
legitimate user pair can be regarded as a different channel state realization, this channel is
equivalent to a compound wiretap channel. Therefore, one can interpret a compound wiretap
channel as multicasting a common confidential message to several legitimate receivers in the
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presence of one or more eavesdroppers [9]. In this work, we mostly refer to this interpretation,
which is also the reason why we classify the compound wiretap channel as an extension of
the wiretap channel to a multi-user setting.
Keeping this interpretation in mind, first works about the compound wiretap channel
are due to Yamamoto [10, 11]. References [10, 11] consider the parallel wiretap channel
with two sub-channels where each sub-channel is wiretapped by a different eavesdropper.
References [10,11] establish capacity-equivocation rate regions for the situation where in each
sub-channel, the legitimate receiver is less noisy with respect to the eavesdropper of this sub-
channel. Other works which implicitly study the compound wiretap channel are [4, 6–8, 12],
where [4,6,7] consider the transmission of a common confidential message to many legitimate
receivers in the presence of a single eavesdropper, [8] focuses on two legitimate receivers one
eavesdropper and one legitimate receiver two eavesdroppers scenarios, and [12] studies the
fading wiretap channel with many receivers. Reference [9] considers the general discrete
compound wiretap channel and provides inner and outer bounds for the secrecy capacity.
In addition to these inner and outer bounds, [9] also establishes the secrecy capacity of
the degraded compound wiretap channel as well as its degraded Gaussian MIMO instance.
Another work on the compound wiretap channel is [13] where the secrecy capacity of a class
of non-degraded Gaussian parallel compound wiretap channels is established.
In this work, we consider compound broadcast channels from a secrecy point of view,
which enables us to study the secure broadcasting problem over compound channels. We note
that the current literature regarding the compound wiretap channel considers the transmis-
sion of only one confidential message, whereas here, we study the transmission of multiple
confidential messages, where each of these messages needs to be delivered to a different
group of users in perfect secrecy. Hereafter, we call this channel model the compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel to emphasize the presence of more than one confidential message.
The compound multi-receiver wiretap channel we study here consists of two groups of users
and a group of eavesdroppers, as shown in Figure 1. We focus on a special class of com-
pound multi-receiver wiretap channels which exhibits a certain degradation order. If we
consider an arbitrary user from each group and an arbitrary eavesdropper, they satisfy a
certain Markov chain. In particular, we assume that there exist two fictitious users. The
first fictitious user is degraded with respect to any user from the first group, and any user
from the second group is degraded with respect to the first fictitious user. There exists a
similar degradedness structure for the second fictitious user in the sense that it is degraded
with respect to any user from the second group, and any eavesdropper is degraded with re-
spect to it. Without eavesdroppers, this channel model reduces to the degraded compound
broadcast channel studied in [14]. Adapting their terminology, we call our channel model the
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel. Here, we consider the general discrete
memoryless version of the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel as well as its
specializations to the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel, the Gaus-
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Figure 1: The degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel.
sian parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel, and the Gaussian MIMO
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel. We study two different communication
scenarios for each version of the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel model.
In the first scenario, which is illustrated in Figure 2, the transmitter wants to send a
confidential message to users in the first group, and a different confidential message to users
in the second group, where both messages need to be kept confidential from the eavesdrop-
pers. For this scenario, we assume that there exists only one eavesdropper and obtain the
secrecy capacity region in a single-letter form. While obtaining this result, the presence of
the fictitious user between the two groups of users plays a crucial role in the converse proof
by providing a conditional independence structure in the channel, which enables us to define
an auxiliary random variable that yields a tight outer bound. After establishing single-letter
expressions for the secrecy capacity region, we consider the parallel degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel. For the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channel, we obtain the secrecy capacity region in a single-letter form as well. Though the
general discrete memoryless degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel encompasses
the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel as a special case, we still need
a converse proof to establish the optimality of independent signalling in each sub-channel.
After we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel, we consider the Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wire-
tap channel. In particular, we evaluate the secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded
compound multi-receiver wiretap channel for the Gaussian case, which is tantamount to find-
ing the optimal joint distribution of auxiliary random variables and channel inputs, which is
shown to be Gaussian. We accomplish this by using Costa’s entropy power inequality [15].
Finally, we consider the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap chan-
nel, and evaluate its secrecy capacity region when there is only one user in the second group.
We show the optimality of a jointly Gaussian distribution for auxiliary random variables and
channel inputs by generalizing our optimization results in [3].
In the second scenario we study here, which is illustrated in Figure 3, the transmitter
wants to send a confidential message to users in the first group which needs to be kept
confidential from users in the second group and eavesdroppers. Moreover, the transmitter
sends a different confidential message to users in the second group, which needs to be kept
4
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Figure 2: The first scenario for the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel.
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Figure 3: The second scenario for the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel.
confidential from the eavesdroppers. If there were only one user in each group and one
eavesdropper, this channel model would reduce to the channel model that was studied in [16].
However, here, there are an arbitrary number of users in each group and an arbitrary number
of eavesdroppers. Hence, our model can be viewed as a generalization of [16] to a compound
setting. Adapting their terminology, we call this channel model the degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel with layered messages. We first obtain the secrecy capacity region
in a single-letter form for a general discrete memoryless setting, where again the presence
of fictitious users plays a key role in the converse proof. Next, we consider the parallel
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages and establish its
secrecy capacity region in a single-letter form. In this case as well, we provide the converse
proof which is again necessary to show the optimality of independent signalling in each
sub-channel. After we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages, we evaluate it for the Gaussian parallel
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages by showing the
optimality of a jointly Gaussian distribution for auxiliary random variables and channel
inputs. For that purpose, we again use Costa’s entropy power inequality [15]. Finally,
we consider the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with
layered messages, and evaluate its secrecy capacity region when there is only one user in the
second group. To this end, we show that jointly Gaussian auxiliary random variables and
channel inputs are optimal by extending our optimization results in [3].
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2 System Model
In this paper, we consider the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel, see Fig-
ure 1, which consists of two groups of users and a group of eavesdroppers. There are K1
users in the first group, K2 users in the second group, and KZ eavesdroppers. The channel
is assumed to be memoryless with a transition probability
p(y11, . . . , y
1
K1
, y21, . . . , y
2
K2
, z1, . . . , zKZ |x) (1)
where X ∈ X is the channel input, Y 1j ∈ Y1j is the channel output of the jth user in the first
group, j = 1, . . . , K1, Y
2
k ∈ Y2k is the channel output of the kth user in the second group,
k = 1, . . . , K2, and Zt ∈ Zt is the channel output of the tth eavesdropper, t = 1, . . . , KZ .
We assume that there exist two fictitious users with observations Y ∗ ∈ Y∗, Z∗ ∈ Z∗ such
that they satisfy the Markov chain
X → Y 1j → Y ∗ → Y 2k → Z∗ → Zt, ∀(j, k, t) (2)
This Markov chain is the reason why we call this channel model the degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel. Actually, there is a slight inexactness in the terminology
here because the Markov chain in (2) is more restrictive than the Markov chain
X → Y 1j → Y 2k → Zt, ∀(j, k, t) (3)
and it might be more natural to define the degradedness of the compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel by the Markov chain in (3). However, in this work, we adapt the terminology
of the previous work on compound broadcast channels [14], and call the channel satisfying
(2) the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel. Finally, we note that when there
are no eavesdroppers, this channel reduces to the degraded compound broadcast channel that
was studied in [14].
2.1 Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wiretap Chan-
nels
The parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel, where each user’s and each
eavesdropper’s channel consists of L independent sub-channels, i.e.,
Y 1j = (Y
1
j1, . . . , Y
1
jL), j = 1, . . . , K1 (4)
Y 2k = (Y
2
k1, . . . , Y
2
kL), k = 1, . . . , K2 (5)
Zt = (Zt1, . . . , ZtL), t = 1, . . . , KZ (6)
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has the following overall transition probability
p(y11, . . . , y
1
K1
, y21, . . . , y
2
K2
, z1, . . . , zKZ |x) =
L∏
ℓ=1
p(y11ℓ, . . . , y
1
K1ℓ
, y21ℓ, . . . , y
2
K2ℓ
, z1ℓ, . . . , zKZℓ|xℓ)
(7)
where Xℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, is the ℓth sub-channel’s input. We define the degradedness of the
parallel compound multi-receiver wiretap channel in a similar fashion. In particular, we call
a parallel compound multi-receiver wiretap channel degraded, if there exist two sequences of
random variables
Y ∗ = (Y ∗1 , . . . , Y
∗
L ) (8)
Z∗ = (Z∗1 , . . . , Z
∗
L) (9)
which satisfy Markov chains
Xℓ → Y 1jℓ → Y ∗ℓ → Y 2kℓ → Z∗ℓ → Ztℓ, ∀(j, k, t, ℓ) (10)
2.2 Gaussian Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wire-
tap Channels
The Gaussian parallel compound multi-receiver wiretap channel is defined by
Y1j = X+N
1
j , j = 1, . . . , K1 (11)
Y2k = X+N
2
k, k = 1, . . . , K2 (12)
Zt = X+N
Z
t , t = 1, . . . , KZ (13)
where all column vectors {Y1j}K1j=1, {Y1k}K2k=1, {Zt}KZt=1,X, {N1j}K1j=1, {N2k}K2k=1, {NZt }KZt=1 are of
dimensions L × 1. {N1j}K1j=1, {N2k}K2k=1, {NZt }KZt=1 are Gaussian random vectors with diagonal
covariance matrices {Λ1j}K1j=1, {Λ2k}K2j=1, {ΛZt }KZt=1, respectively. The channel input X is subject
to a trace constraint as
E
[
X⊤X
]
= tr
(
E
[
XX⊤
]) ≤ P (14)
In this paper, we will be interested in Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channels which means that the covariance matrices satisfy the following order
Λ1j  Λ2k  ΛZt , ∀(j, k, t) (15)
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Since noise covariance matrices are diagonal, the order in (15) implies
Λ1j,ℓℓ ≤ Λ2k,ℓℓ ≤ ΛZt,ℓℓ, ∀(j, k, t, ℓ) (16)
where Λ1j,ℓℓ,Λ
2
k,ℓℓ,Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ denote the ℓth diagonal element of Λ
1
j ,Λ
2
k,Λ
Z
t , respectively.
The diagonality of noise covariance matrices also ensures the existence of diagonal ma-
trices Λ∗Y and Λ
∗
Z such that
Λ1j  Λ∗Y  Λ2k  Λ∗Z  ΛZt , ∀(k, j, t) (17)
For example, we can select Λ∗Y as Λ
∗
Y,ℓℓ = maxj=1,...,K1 Λ
1
j,ℓℓ which already satisfies (17)
because of maxj=1,...,K1 Λ
1
j,ℓℓ ≤ mink=1,...,K2 Λ2k,ℓℓ which is due to (16). Similarly, we can select
Λ∗Z . Thus, for Gaussian parallel compound multi-receiver channels, the two possible ways
of defining degradedness, i.e., (2) and (3), are equivalent due to the equivalence of (15) and
(17).
2.3 Gaussian MIMO Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wire-
tap Channels
The Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel is defined by
Y1j = X+N
1
j , j = 1, . . . , K1 (18)
Y2k = X+N
2
k, k = 1, . . . , K2 (19)
Zt = X+N
Z
t , t = 1, . . . , KZ (20)
where all column vectors {Y1j}K1j=1, {Y2k}K2k=1, {Zt}KZt=1,X, {N1j}K1j=1, {N2k}K2k=1, {NZt }KZt=1 are of
dimensionsM×1. {N1j}K1j=1, {N2k}K2k=1, {NZt }KZt=1 are Gaussian random vectors with covariance
matrices {Σ1j}K1j=1, {Σ2k}K2k=1, {ΣZt }KZt=1, respectively. Unlike in the case of Gaussian parallel
channels, these covariance matrices are not necessarily diagonal. The channel input X is
subject to a covariance constraint
E
[
XX⊤
]  S (21)
where S ≻ 0.
In this paper, we study Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap chan-
nels for which there exist covariance matrices Σ∗Y and Σ
∗
Z such that
Σ1j  Σ∗Y  Σ2k  Σ∗Z  ΣZt , ∀(j, k, t) (22)
We note that the order in (22), by which we define the degradedness, is more restrictive than
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the other possible order that can be used to define the degradedness, i.e.,
Σ1j  Σ2k  ΣZt , ∀(j, k, t) (23)
In [14], a specific numerical example is provided to show that the order in (23) strictly
subsumes the one in (22).
2.4 Comments on Gaussian MIMO Degraded Compound Multi-
receiver Wiretap Channels
We provide some comments about the way we define the Gaussian MIMO degraded com-
pound multi-receiver wiretap channel. The first one is about the covariance constraint in
(21). Though it is more common to define capacity regions under a total power constraint,
i.e., tr
(
E
[
XX⊤
]) ≤ P , the covariance constraint in (21) is more general and it subsumes
the total power constraint as a special case [17]. In particular, if we denote the secrecy
capacity region under the constraint in (21) by C(S), then the secrecy capacity region under
the trace constraint, tr
(
E
[
XX⊤
]) ≤ P , can be written as [17]
Ctrace(P ) =
⋃
S:tr(S)≤P
C(S) (24)
The second comment is about our assumption that S is strictly positive definite. This
assumption does not lead to any loss of generality because for any Gaussian MIMO compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel with a positive semi-definite covariance constraint, i.e., S  0
and |S| = 0, we can always construct an equivalent channel with the constraint E [XX⊤] 
S′ where S′ ≻ 0 (see Lemma 2 of [17]), which has the same secrecy capacity region.
The last comment is about the assumption that the transmitter and all receivers have
the same number of antennas. This assumption is implicit in the channel definition, see
(18)-(20), and also in the definition of degradedness, see (22). However, we can extend
the definition of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel to
include the cases where the number of transmit antennas and the number of receive antennas
at each receiver are not necessarily the same. To this end, we first introduce the following
channel model
Y1j = H
1
jX+N
1
j , j = 1, . . . , K1 (25)
Y2k = H
2
kX+N
2
k, k = 1, . . . , K2 (26)
Zt = H
Z
t X+N
Z
t , t = 1, . . . , KZ (27)
where H1j ,H
2
k,H
Z
t are the channel matrices of sizes r
1
j × t, r2k × t, rZt × t, respectively, and X
is of size t×1. The channel outputs Y1j ,Y2k,Zt are of sizes r1j ×1, r2k×1, rZt ×1, respectively.
The Gaussian noise vectors N1j ,N
2
k,N
Z
t are assumed to have identity covariance matrices.
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To define degradedness for the channel model given in (25)-(27), we need the following
definition from [14]: A receive vector Ya = HaX+Na of size ra × 1 is said to be degraded
with respect to Yb = HbX+Nb of size rb × 1, if there exists a matrix D of size ra × rb such
that DHb = Ha and DD
⊤  I. Using this equivalent definition of degradedness, we now
give the equivalent definition of degradedness for the channel model in (25)-(27). To this
end, we first introduce two fictitious users with observations Y∗ and Z∗, which are given by
Y∗ = H∗YX+N
∗
Y (28)
Z∗ = H∗ZX+N
∗
Z (29)
The Gaussian MIMO compound multi-receiver wiretap channel in (25)-(27) is said to be
degraded if the following two conditions hold: i) Y∗ is degraded with respect to any user
from the first group, and any user from the second group is degraded with respect to Y∗,
and ii) Z∗ is degraded with respect to any user from the second group, and any eavesdropper
is degraded with respect to Z∗, where degradedness here is with respect to the definition
given above.
In the rest of the paper, we consider the channel model given in (18)-(20) instead of the
channel model given in (25)-(27), which is more general. However, if we establish the secrecy
capacity region for the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel
defined by (18)-(20), we can also obtain the secrecy capacity region for the Gaussian MIMO
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel defined by (25)-(27) using the analysis
carried out in Section V of [14] and Section 7.1 of [3]. Thus, focusing on the channel model
in (18)-(20) does not result in any loss of generality.
3 Problem Statement and Main Results
In this paper, we consider two different communication scenarios for the degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel.
3.1 The First Scenario: External Eavesdroppers
In the first scenario, the transmitter wants to send a confidential message to users in the
first group and a different confidential message to users in the second group, where both
messages need to be kept confidential from the eavesdroppers. In this case, we assume that
there is only one eavesdropper, i.e., KZ = 1. The graphical illustration of the first scenario
is given in Figure 2.
An (n, 2nR1 , 2nR2) code for the first scenario consists of two message sets W1 = {1, . . . ,
2nR1},W2 = {1, . . . , 2nR2}, an encoder f : W1 ×W2 → X n, one decoder for each legitimate
user in the first group g1j : Y1,nj → W1, j = 1, . . . , K1, and one decoder for each legitimate
user in the second group g2k : Y2,nk →W2, k = 1, . . . , K2. The probability of error is defined
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as
P ne = max
{
P 1,ne , P
2,n
e
}
(30)
where P 1,ne and P
2,n
e are given by
P 1,ne = max
j∈{1,...,K1}
Pr
[
g1j
(
Y
1,n
j
) 6= W1] (31)
P 2,ne = max
k∈{1,...,K2}
Pr
[
g2k
(
Y
2,n
k
) 6= W2] (32)
A secrecy rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exists an (n, 2
nR1, 2nR2) code
which has limn→∞ P ne = 0 and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z
n) = 0 (33)
where we dropped the subscript of Zt since KZ = 1. We note that (33) implies
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1;Z
n) = 0 and lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W2;Z
n) = 0 (34)
From these definitions, it is clear that we are only interested in perfect secrecy rates of the
channel. The secrecy capacity region is defined as the closure of all achievable secrecy rate
pairs. A single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity region is given as follows.
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity region of the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channel is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
I(X ; Y 1j |U,Z) (35)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
I(U ; Y 2k |Z) (36)
where the union is over all (U,X) such that
U → X → Y 1j → Y ∗ → Y 2k → Z (37)
for any (j, k) pair.
Showing the achievability of this region is rather standard, thus is omitted here. We provide
the converse proof in Appendix A. The presence of the fictitious user with observation Y ∗
proves to be crucial in the converse proof. Essentially, it brings a conditional independence
structure to the channel, which enables us to define the auxiliary random variable U , which,
in turn, provides the converse proof.
As a side note, if we disable the eavesdropper by setting Z = φ, the region in Theorem 1
reduces to the capacity region of the underlying degraded compound broadcast channel which
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was established in [14].
3.1.1 Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channels
In the upcoming section, we will consider the Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel. For that purpose, here, we provide the secrecy capacity region of
the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel in a single-letter form.
Theorem 2 The secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ; Y
1
jℓ|Uℓ, Zℓ) (38)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ; Y
2
kℓ|Zℓ) (39)
where the union is over all distributions of the form
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ) such that
Uℓ → Xℓ → Y 1jℓ → Y ∗ℓ → Y 2kℓ → Zℓ (40)
for any (j, k, ℓ) triple.
Though Theorem 1 provides the secrecy capacity region for a rather general channel model
including the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver channel as a special case, we still
need a converse proof to show that the region in Theorem 1 reduces to the region in Theorem 2
for parallel channels. In other words, we still need to show the optimality of independent
signalling on each sub-channel. This proof is provided in Appendix B.
3.1.2 Gaussian Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channels
We now obtain the secrecy capacity region of the parallel Gaussian degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel. To that end, we need to evaluate the region given in Theo-
rem 2, i.e., we need to find the optimal joint distribution
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ). We first introduce
the following theorem which will be instrumental in evaluating the region in Theorem 2 for
Gaussian parallel channels.
Theorem 3 Let N1, N
∗, N2, NZ be zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances
σ21, σ
2
∗ , σ
2
2, σ
2
Z , respectively, where
σ21 ≤ σ2∗ ≤ σ22 ≤ σ2Z (41)
Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily dependent random variable pair, which is independent of
(N1, N
∗, N2, NZ), and the second-moment of X be constrained as E [X2] ≤ P . Then, for
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any feasible (U,X), we can find a P ∗ ≤ P such that
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N∗|U) = 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ2∗
(42)
and
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ21
(43)
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ22
(44)
for any (σ21 , σ
2
2) satisfying the order in (41).
Costa’s entropy power inequality [15] plays a key role in the proof of this theorem. The proof
of this theorem is provided in Appendix C.
We are now ready to establish the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian parallel de-
graded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel.
Theorem 4 The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
Λ1j,ℓℓ
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
ΛZ,ℓℓ
)
(45)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
β¯ℓPℓ
βℓPℓ + Λ2k,ℓℓ
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
β¯ℓPℓ
βℓPℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
)
(46)
where the union is over all {Pℓ}Lℓ=1 such that
∑L
ℓ=1 Pℓ = P and β¯ℓ = 1 − βℓ ∈ [0, 1], ℓ =
1, . . . , L.
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix D. Here, Pℓ denotes the part of the total
available power P which is devoted to the transmission in the ℓth sub-channel. Furthermore,
βℓ denotes the fraction of the power Pℓ of the ℓth sub-channel spent for the transmission to
users in the first group.
3.1.3 Gaussian MIMO Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
In this section, we first obtain the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded
compound multi-receiver wiretap channel when K2 = 1, and then partially characterize the
secrecy capacity region for the case K2 > 1. To that end, we need to evaluate the region
given in Theorem 1. In other words, we need to find the optimal random variable pair (U,X).
We are able to do this for the entire capacity region when there is only one user in the second
group, i.e., K2 = 1. For this, we need the following theorem.
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Theorem 5 Let (N1,N
∗,NZ) be zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance ma-
trices Σ1,Σ
∗,ΣZ , respectively, where
Σ1  Σ∗  ΣZ (47)
Let (U,X) be arbitrarily dependent random vector, which is independent of (N1,N
∗,NZ),
and let the second moment of X be constrained as E
[
XX⊤
]  S. Then, for any feasible
(U,X), we can find a positive semi-definite matrix K∗ such that K∗  S, and it satisfies
h(X+NZ |U)− h(X+N∗|U) = 1
2
log
|K∗ +ΣZ |
|K∗ +Σ∗| (48)
and
h(X+NZ|U)− h(X+N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
|K∗ +ΣZ |
|K∗ +Σ1| (49)
for any Σ1 satisfying the order in (47).
The proof of this theorem can be found in [3]. Using this theorem, we can establish the
secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channel when K2 = 1 as follows.
Theorem 6 The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound channel
when K2 = 1 is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+ΣZ|
|ΣZ| (50)
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S+ΣZ|
|K+ΣZ | (51)
where we dropped the subscript of Σ2k since K2 = 1, and the union is over all positive semi-
definite matrices K such that K  S.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix E.
We now consider the case K2 > 1. We first note that since the secrecy capacity region
given in Theorem 1 is convex, the boundary of this region can be written as the solution of
the following optimization problem
max
(U,X)
min
j=1,...,K1
R1j + µ min
k=1,...,K2
R2k (52)
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where R1j and R2k are given by
R1j = I(X;Y
1
j |U,Z) = I(X;Y1j |U)− I(X;Z|U) (53)
R2k = I(U ;Y
2
k|Z) = I(U ;Y2k)− I(U ;Z) (54)
respectively, and the maximization is over all (U,X) such that E
[
XX⊤
]  S. In the sequel,
we show that jointly Gaussian (U,X) is the maximizer for (52) when µ ≤ 1. To this end,
we need to consider the optimal Gaussian solution for (52), i.e., the solution of (52) when
(U,X) is restricted to be Gaussian. The corresponding optimization problem is
max
0KS
min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K) + µ min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K) (55)
where RG1j(K) and R
G
2k(K) are given by
RG1j(K) =
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+ΣZ|
|ΣZ| (56)
RG2k(K) =
1
2
log
|S+Σ2k|
|K+Σ2k|
− 1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ| (57)
We assume that the maximum for (55) occurs at K = K∗, and the corresponding rate pair
is (R∗1, R
∗
2)
1, i.e.,
R∗1 = min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K
∗) (58)
R∗2 = min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K
∗) (59)
The KKT conditions that this optimal covariance matrix K∗ needs to satisfy are given in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The optimal covariance matrix for (55), K∗, needs to satisfy
K1∑
j=1
λ1j(K
∗ +Σ1j )
−1 − (K∗ +ΣZ)−1 +M = µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k(K
∗ +Σ2k)
−1 − µ(K∗ +ΣZ)−1 +MS
(60)
where
∑K1
j=1 λ1j = 1, and λ1j ≥ 0 with equality if RG1j(K∗) > R∗1;
∑K2
k=1 λ2k = 1, and λ2k ≥ 0
with equality if RG2k(K
∗) > R∗2; and M and MS are positive semi-definite matrices which
satisfy K∗M =MK∗ = 0 and (S−K∗)MS =MS(S−K∗) = 0, respectively.
1With this assumption, we implicitly assume that the maximum in (55) occurs at a single rate pair
(R∗
1
, R∗
2
). In fact, there might be more than one rate pair where the maximum occurs. Even if this is the
case, we can simply consider only one of them, since our ultimate goal is to show that the maximum in (52)
is equal to the maximum in (55).
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The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix F.
To show that both (52) and (55) have the same value when µ ≤ 1, we use the following
optimization result due to [14].
Lemma 2 ([14], Lemma 2) Let U,X, {N1j}K1j=1, {N2k}K2k=1,NZ be as defined before. The fol-
lowing expression
K1∑
j=1
λ1jh(X+N
1
j |U)− µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2kh(X+N
2
k|U)− (1− µ)h(X+NZ |U) (61)
is maximized by jointly Gaussian (U,X) when µ ≤ 1. Furthermore, the optimal covariance
matrix needs to satisfy (60), where M and MS are as they are defined in Lemma 1.
In [14], a weaker version of this lemma is proved. This weaker version requires the
existence of a covariance matrix K∗ for which the Lagrange multiplier M in (60) is zero.
However, using the channel enhancement technique [17], this requirement can be removed.
Using Lemma 2 in conjunction with Lemma 1, we are able to characterize the secrecy capacity
region partially for the case K2 > 1.
Theorem 7 The boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO
compound multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the solution of the following optimization
problem
max
0KS
min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K) + µ min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K) (62)
for µ ≤ 1. That is, for this part of the secrecy rate region, jointly Gaussian auxiliary random
variables and channel inputs are optimal.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix F.
3.2 The Second Scenario: Layered Confidential Messages
In the second scenario, the transmitter wants to send a confidential message to users in
the first group which needs to be kept confidential from the second group of users and
eavesdroppers. The transmitter also wants to send a different confidential message to users in
the second group, which needs to be kept confidential from the eavesdroppers. As opposed to
the first scenario, in this case, we do not put any restriction on the number of eavesdroppers.
The graphical illustration of the second scenario is given in Figure 3. The situation where
there is only one user in each group and one eavesdropper was investigated in [16]. Hence,
this second scenario can be seen as a generalization of the model in [16] to a compound
channel setting. Following the terminology of [16], we call this channel model the degraded
compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages.
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An (n, 2nR1, 2nR2) code for the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with
layered messages consists of two message sets W1 = {1, . . . , 2nR1},W2 = {1, . . . , 2nR2} and
an encoder f : W1 × W2 → X n, one decoder for each legitimate user in the first group
g1j : Y1,nj →W1, j = 1, . . . , K1, and one decoder for each legitimate user in the second group
g2k : Y2,nk →W2, k = 1, . . . , K2. The probability of error is defined as
P ne = max{P 1,ne , P 2,ne } (63)
where P 1,ne and P
2,n
e are given by
P 1,ne = max
j∈{1,...,K1}
Pr
[
g1j (Y
1,n
j ) 6= W1
]
(64)
P 2,ne = max
k∈{1,...,K2}
Pr
[
g2k(Y
2,n
k ) 6= W2
]
(65)
A secrecy rate pair is said to be achievable if there exists an (n, 2nR1, 2nR2) code which has
limn→∞ P ne = 0,
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W2;Z
n
t ) = 0, t = 1, . . . , KZ (66)
and
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1; Y
2,n
k |W2) = 0, k = 1, . . . , K2 (67)
We note that these two secrecy conditions imply
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W1,W2;Z
n
t ) = 0, t = 1, . . . , KZ (68)
Furthermore, it is clear that we are only interested in perfect secrecy rates of the channel.
The secrecy capacity region is defined as the closure of all achievable secrecy rate pairs. A
single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity region is given as follows.
Theorem 8 The secrecy capacity region of the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channel with layered messages is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
I(X ; Y 1j |U, Y 2k ) (69)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
I(U ; Y 2k |Zt) (70)
where the union is over all random variable pairs (U,X) such that
U → X → Y 1j → Y ∗ → Y 2k → Z∗ → Zt (71)
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for any triple (j, k, t).
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix G. Similar to the converse proof of Theorem 1,
the presence of the fictitious users Y ∗ and Z∗ plays an important role here as well. In
particular, these two random variables introduce a conditional independence structure to
the channel which enables us to define the auxiliary random variable U that yields a tight
outer bound. Despite this similarity in the role of fictitious users in converse proofs, there
is a significant difference between Theorems 1 and 8; in particular, it does not seem to be
possible to extend Theorem 1 to an arbitrary number of eavesdroppers, while Theorem 8
holds for any number of eavesdroppers. This is due to the difference of two communication
scenarios. In the second scenario, since we assume that users in the second group as well as
the eavesdroppers wiretap users in the first group, we are able to provide a converse proof
for the general situation of arbitrary number of eavesdroppers.
As an aside, if we set K1 = K2 = KZ = 1, then as the degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel with layered messages reduces to the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel
with layered messages of [16], the secrecy capacity region in Theorem 8 reduces to the secrecy
capacity region of the channel model in [16].
3.2.1 Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels with Lay-
ered Messages
In the next section, we investigate the Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel with layered messages. To that end, here we obtain the secrecy capacity re-
gion of the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages
in a single-letter form as follows.
Theorem 9 The secrecy capacity region of the parallel degraded compound multi-receiver
wiretap channel with layered messages is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ; Y
1
jℓ|Uℓ, Y 2kℓ) (72)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ; Y
2
kℓ|Ztℓ) (73)
where the union is over all
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ) such that
Uℓ → Xℓ → Y 1jℓ → Y ∗ℓ → Y 2kℓ → Z∗ℓ → Ztℓ (74)
for any (ℓ, j, k, t).
Since parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channels with layered messages
is a special case of the degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel, Theorem 8 implic-
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itly gives the secrecy capacity region of parallel degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channels with layered messages. However, we still need to show that the region in Theorem 8
is equivalent to the region in Theorem 9. That is, we need to prove the optimality of inde-
pendent signalling in each sub-channel. The proof of Theorem 9 is provided in Appendix H.
3.2.2 Gaussian Parallel Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
with Layered Messages
We now obtain the secrecy capacity region of Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channels with layered messages. To that end, we need to evaluate the region
given in Theorem 9, i.e., we need to find the optimal distribution
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ). We first
introduce the following theorem, which is an extension of Theorem 3.
Theorem 10 Let N1, N
∗, N2, N˜ , NZ be zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances
σ21, σ
2
∗ , σ
2
2, σ˜
2, σ2Z , respectively, where
σ21 ≤ σ2∗ ≤ σ22 ≤ σ˜2 ≤ σ2Z (75)
Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily dependent random variable pair, which is independent of
(N1, N
∗, N2, N˜ , NZ), and the second moment of X be constrained as E [X2] ≤ P . Then,
for any feasible (U,X), we can find a P ∗ ≤ P such that
h(X + N˜ |U)− h(X +N∗|U) = 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ˜2
P ∗ + σ2∗
(76)
and
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ22
(77)
h(X +N2|U)− h(X +N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ22
P ∗ + σ21
(78)
for any (σ21 , σ
2
2, σ
2
Z) satisfying the order in (75).
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix I. The proof of this theorem basically relies
on Theorem 3 and Costa’s entropy power inequality [15].
Using this theorem, we can establish the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian parallel
degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages as follows.
Theorem 11 The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian parallel degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel with layered messages is given by the union of rate pairs (R1, R2)
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satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
Λ1j,ℓℓ
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
Λ2k,ℓℓ
)
(79)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
β¯ℓPℓ
βℓPℓ + Λ2k,ℓℓ
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
β¯ℓPℓ
βℓPℓ + Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ
)
(80)
where β¯ℓ = 1−βℓ ∈ [0, 1], ℓ = 1, . . . , L, and the union is over all {Pℓ}Lℓ=1 such that
∑L
ℓ=1 Pℓ =
P .
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix J. Similar to Theorem 4, here also, Pℓ denotes
the amount of power P devoted to the transmission in the ℓth sub-channel. Similarly, βℓ is
the fraction of the power Pℓ of the ℓth sub-channel spent for the transmission to users in the
first group.
3.2.3 Gaussian MIMO Degraded Compound Multi-receiver Wiretap Channels
with Layered Messages
We now obtain the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel with layered messages. To that end, we need to evaluate the
region given in Theorem 8, i.e., find the optimal random vector pair (U,X). We are able to
find the optimal random vector pair (U,X) when there is only one user in the second group,
i.e., K2 = 1. To obtain that result, we first need the following generalization of Theorem 5.
Theorem 12 Let (N1,N2,N
∗,NZ) be Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices
Σ1,Σ2,Σ
∗,ΣZ , respectively, where
Σ1  Σ2  Σ∗  ΣZ (81)
Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily dependent random vector pair, which is independent of
(N1,N2,N
∗,NZ), and the second moment of X be constrained as E
[
XX⊤
]  S. Then,
for any feasible (U,X), there exists a positive semi-definite matrix K∗ such that K∗  S,
and it satisfies
h(X+N∗|U)− h(X+N2|U) = 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ2| (82)
and
h(X+NZ|U)− h(X+N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
|K∗ +ΣZ |
|K∗ +Σ2| (83)
h(X+N2|U)− h(X+N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ2|
|K∗ +Σ1| (84)
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for any (Σ1,ΣZ) satisfying the order in (81).
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix L. Using this theorem, we can find the
secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-receiver wiretap
channel with layered messages when K2 = 1 as follows.
Theorem 13 The secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO degraded compound multi-
receiver wiretap channel with layered messages when K2 = 1 is given by the union of rate
pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+Σ2|
|Σ2| (85)
R2 ≤ min
t=1,...,KZ
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S+ΣZt |
|K+ΣZt |
(86)
where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices K such that K  S.
The proof of this theorem is given in Appendix M. As an aside, if we set K1 = KZ = 1
in this theorem, we can recover the secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver
wiretap channel with layered messages that was established in [16].
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied two different communication scenarios for the degraded compound
multi-receiver wiretap channel. In the first scenario, the transmitter wants to send a confi-
dential message to users in the first group, and a different confidential message to users in
the second group, where both messages are to be kept confidential from an eavesdropper. We
establish the secrecy capacity region of the general discrete memoryless channel model, the
parallel channel model, and the Gaussian parallel channel model. For the Gaussian MIMO
channel model, we obtain the secrecy capacity region when there is only one user in the
second group. We also provide a partial characterization of the secrecy capacity region when
there are an arbitrary number of users in the second group.
In the second scenario we study, the transmitter sends a confidential message to users in
the first group which is wiretapped by both users in the second group and eavesdroppers.
In addition to this message sent to the first group of users, the transmitter sends a different
message to users in the second group which needs to be kept confidential only from the
eavesdroppers. In this case, we do not put any restriction on the number of eavesdroppers.
As in the first scenario, we establish the secrecy capacity region for the general discrete
memoryless channel model, the parallel channel model, and the Gaussian parallel channel
model. For the Gaussian MIMO channel model, we obtain the secrecy capacity region when
there is only one user in the second group.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
Achievability is clear. We provide the converse proof. For an arbitrary code achieving the
secrecy rates (R1, R2), there exist (ǫ1,n, ǫ2,n) and γn which vanish as n→∞ such that
H(W1|Y 1,nj ) ≤ nǫ1,n, j = 1, . . . , K1 (87)
H(W2|Y 2,nk ) ≤ nǫ2,n, k = 1, . . . , K2 (88)
I(W1,W2;Z
n) ≤ nγn (89)
where (87) and (88) are due to Fano’s lemma, and (89) is due to the perfect secrecy require-
ment stated in (33).
We define the following auxiliary random variables
Ui =W2Y
∗,i−1Zni+1, i = 1, . . . , n (90)
which satisfy the following Markov chain
Ui → Xi → Y 1j,i → Y ∗i → Y 2k,i → Zi, i = 1, . . . , n (91)
for any (j, k) pair. The Markov chain in (91) is a consequence of the fact that the channel
is memoryless and degraded.
22
We first bound the rate of the second message:
nR2 = H(W2) (92)
≤ I(W2; Y 2,nk ) + nǫ2,n (93)
≤ I(W2; Y 2,nk )− I(W2;Zn) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (94)
= I(W2; Y
2,n
k |Zn) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (95)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Y 2,i−1k , Zn) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (96)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Y 2,i−1k , Zni+1, Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (97)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y 2,i−1k , Z
n
i+1,W2; Y
2
k,i|Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (98)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Y ∗,i−1, Y 2,i−1k , Z
n
i+1,W2; Y
2
k,i|Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (99)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1,W2; Y
2
k,i|Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (100)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y
2
k,i|Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (101)
where (93) is due to (88), (94) is a consequence of (89), (95) comes from the Markov chain
W2 → Y 2,nk → Zn, k = 1, . . . , K2 (102)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is degraded, (97) comes from the Markov
chain
Z i−1 → Y 2,i−1k → (Y 2k,i, Zni ,W2), k = 1, . . . , K2 (103)
which is due to the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless, and (100) is a conse-
quence of the Markov chain
Y
2,i−1
k → Y ∗,i−1 → (W2, Zni , Y 2k,i), k = 1, . . . , K2 (104)
which is due to the Markov chain in (2) and the fact that the channel is memoryless.
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Next we bound the rate of the first message:
nR1 = H(W1) (105)
= H(W1|W2) (106)
≤ I(W1; Y 1,nj |W2) + nǫ1,n (107)
≤ I(W1; Y 1,nj |W2)− I(W1;Zn|W2) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (108)
= I(W1; Y
1,n
j |W2, Zn) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (109)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zn, Y 1,i−1j ) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (110)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (111)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (112)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi,W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (113)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (114)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi)−H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi, Xi)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (115)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y ∗,i−1, Zi)−H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zi, Xi)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (116)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y ∗,i−1, Zi)−H(Y 1j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y ∗,i−1, Zi, Xi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn)
(117)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
1
j,i|W2, Zni+1, Y ∗,i−1, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (118)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
1
j,i|Ui, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (119)
where (107) is due to (87), (108) is a consequence of (89), (109) comes from the Markov
chain
(W2,W1)→ Y 1,nj → Zn, j = 1, . . . , K1 (120)
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which is due to the fact that the channel is degraded, (111) comes from the Markov chain
Z i−1 → Y 1,i−1j → (W1,W2, Y 1j,i, Zni ), j = 1, . . . , K1 (121)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is degraded and memoryless, (112) follows
from the Markov chain
Y ∗,i−1 → Y 1,i−1j → (W1,W2, Y 1j,i, Zni ), j = 1, . . . , K1 (122)
which results from the Markov chain in (2) and the fact that the channel is memoryless,
(114) is a consequence of the Markov chain
(Y 1j,i, Zi)→ Xi → (Y ∗,i−1, Y 1,i−1j , Zni+1,W1,W2), j = 1, . . . , K1 (123)
which is due to the fact that the channel is memoryless, (116) comes from the fact that
conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (117) is again due to the Markov chain in (123).
Next, we define a uniformly distributed random variable Q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and U =
(Q,UQ), X = XQ, Y
1
j = Y
1
j,Q, Y
2
k = Y
2
k,Q, and Z = ZQ. Using these definitions in (101)
and (119), we obtain the single-letter expressions in Theorem 1.
B Proof of Theorem 2
The achievability of this region follows from Theorem 1 by selecting (U,X) = (U1, X1, . . . , UL,
XL) with a joint distribution of the product form p(u, x) =
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ). We next provide
the converse proof. To that end, we define the following auxiliary random variables
Uℓ,i = W2Y
∗,i−1Zni+1Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],iZ[ℓ+1:L],i, i = 1, . . . , n, ℓ = 1, . . . , L (124)
which satisfy the Markov chain
Uℓ,i → Xℓ,i → (Y 1jℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i, Zℓ,i) (125)
for any (j, k, ℓ) triple because of the facts that the channel is memoryless and sub-channels
are independent.
We bound the rate of the second message. Following the same steps as in the converse
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proof of Theorem 1, we get to (97). Then,
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Y 2,i−1k , Zni+1, Zi) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (126)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Y 2,i−1k , Zni+1, Zi, Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (127)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Y 2,i−1k , Zni+1, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i, Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (128)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Y 2,i−1k , Z
n
i+1, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
2
k[1:ℓ−1],i,W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (129)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Y 2,i−1k , Y
∗,i−1, Zni+1, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
2
k[1:ℓ−1],i, Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],i,W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Zℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ2,n + γn) (130)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],i,W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (131)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ,i; Y
2
kℓ,i|Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γn) (132)
where (128) follows from the Markov chain
Z[1:ℓ−1],i → Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i → (W2, Y 2,i−1k , Zni+1, Z[ℓ:L],i, Y 2kℓ,i) (133)
which is a consequence of the facts that the channel is degraded and memoryless, and sub-
channels are independent, and (131) is due to the Markov chain
(Y 2,i−1k , Y
2
k[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (Y ∗,i−1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (W2, Zni+1, Z[ℓ:L],i, Y 2kℓ,i) (134)
which is a consequence of the Markov chain in (10) and the facts that the channel is memo-
ryless and sub-channels are independent.
We next bound the rate of the first message. Again, following the same steps as in the
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converse proof of Theorem 1, we get to (111). Then,
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Zni+1, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (135)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Zi) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (136)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (137)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (138)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i,W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (139)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (140)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
−H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i, Xℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (141)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
−H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i, Xℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γn) (142)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i)
−H(Y 1jℓ,i|W2, Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i, Xℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (143)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i, Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (144)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i; Y
1
jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Zℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γn) (145)
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where (137) follows from the Markov chain
Z[1:ℓ−1],i → Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i → (W1,W2, Y 1,i−1j , Zni+1, Y 1jℓ,i, Z[ℓ:L],i) (146)
which is due to the facts that the channel is degraded and memoryless, and sub-channels are
independent, (138) comes from the Markov chain
(Y ∗,i−1, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (Y 1,i−1j , Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (W1,W2, Zni+1, Z[ℓ:L],i, Y 1jℓ,i) (147)
which results from the Markov chain in (10) and the facts that the channel is memoryless,
and sub-channels are independent, (140) comes from the Markov chain
(Y 1jℓ,i, Zℓ,i)→ Xℓ,i → (W1,W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y ∗,i−1, Zni+1, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i, Z[ℓ+1:L],i) (148)
which is a consequence of the facts that the channel is memoryless, and sub-channels are
independent, (142) results from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy, and (143)
is due to the Markov chain in (148).
Next, we a define a uniformly distributed random variable Q ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and Uℓ =
(Q,Uℓ,Q), X = Xℓ,Q, Y
1
jℓ = Y
1
jℓ,Q, Y
2
kℓ = Y
2
kℓ,Q, and Zℓ = Zℓ,Q. Using these definitions in
(132) and (145), we obtain the single-letter expressions in Theorem 2. Finally, we note that
although auxiliary random variables {Uℓ}Lℓ=1 are dependent, their joint distribution does not
affect the bounds in Theorem 2. Thus, without loss of generality, we can select them to be
independent.
C Proof of Theorem 3
We first note that
1
2
log
σ2∗
σ2Z
≤ h(X +N∗|U)− h(X +NZ |U) ≤ 1
2
log
P + σ2∗
P + σ2Z
(149)
where the right-hand side can be shown via the entropy power inequality [18, 19]. To show
the left-hand side, let us define a Gaussian random variable N˜ with variance σ2Z − σ2∗, and
independent of (U,X,N∗). Thus, we can write down the difference of differential entropy
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terms in (149) as
h(X +N∗|U)− h(X +NZ |U) = h(X +N∗|U)− h(X +N∗ + N˜ |U) (150)
= −I(N˜ ;X +N∗ + N˜ |U) (151)
= −h(N˜ |U) + h(N˜ |U,X +N∗ + N˜) (152)
≥ −h(N˜ |U) + h(N˜ |U,X +N∗ + N˜ ,X) (153)
= −h(N˜) + h(N˜ |N∗ + N˜) (154)
=
1
2
log
σ2∗
σ2Z
(155)
where (153) is due to the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy and (154) is a
consequence of the fact that (U,X) and (N∗, N˜) are independent.
Equation (149) implies that there exists P ∗ such that P ∗ ≤ P and
h(X +N∗|U)− h(X +NZ |U) = 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2∗
P ∗ + σ2Z
(156)
which will be used frequently hereafter.
We now state Costa’s entropy power inequality [15] which will be used in the upcoming
proof2.
Lemma 3 ([15], Theorem 1) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily dependent random variable pair,
which is independent of N , where N is a Gaussian random variable. Then, we have
e2h(X+
√
tN |U) ≥ (1− t)e2h(X|U) + te2h(X+N |U), 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 (157)
We now consider (43). We first note that we can write N∗ as
N∗ = N1 +
√
t1N˜1 (158)
where N˜1 is a Gaussian random variable with variance σ
2
Z − σ21 , which is independent of
(U,X,N1). t1 in (158) is given by
t1 =
σ2∗ − σ21
σ2Z − σ21
(159)
where it is clear that t1 ∈ [0, 1]. Using (158) and Costa’s entropy power inequality [15], we
2Although, Theorem 1 of [15] states the inequality for a constant U , using Jensen’s inequality, the current
form of the inequality for an arbitrary U can be shown.
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get
e2h(X+N
∗|U) = e2h(X+N1+
√
t1N˜1|U) (160)
≥ (1− t1)e2h(X+N1|U) + t1e2h(X+NZ |U) (161)
which is equivalent to
(1− t1)e2[h(X+N1|U)−h(X+NZ |U)] + t1 ≤ e2[h(X+N∗|U)−h(X+NZ |U)] (162)
=
P ∗ + σ2∗
P ∗ + σ2Z
(163)
where (163) is obtained by using (156). Equation (163) is equivalent to
h(X +N1|U)− h(X +NZ |U) ≤ 1
2
log
1
1− t1
(
P ∗ + σ2∗
P ∗ + σ2Z
− t1
)
(164)
=
1
2
log
(
P ∗
P ∗ + σ2Z
+
1
1− t1
σ2∗ − t1σ2Z
P ∗ + σ2Z
)
(165)
=
1
2
log
P ∗ + σ21
P ∗ + σ2Z
(166)
where we used the definition of t1 given in (159) to obtain (166). Equation (166) proves (43).
We now consider (44). First, we note that we can write N2
N2 = N
∗ +
√
t2N˜Z (167)
where N˜Z is a Gaussian random variable with variance σ
2
Z − σ2∗ , which is independent of
(U,X,N∗). t2 in (167) is given by
t2 =
σ22 − σ2∗
σ2Z − σ2∗
(168)
where it is clear that t2 ∈ [0, 1]. Using (167) and Costa’s entropy power inequality [15], we
get
e2h(X+N2|U) = e2h(X+N
∗+
√
t2N˜Z |U) (169)
≥ (1− t2)e2h(X+N∗|U) + t2e2h(X+NZ |U) (170)
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which is equivalent to
e2[h(X+N2|U)−h(X+NZ |U)] ≥ (1− t2)e2[h(X+N∗|U)−h(X+NZ |U)] + t2 (171)
= (1− t2)P
∗ + σ2∗
P ∗ + σ2Z
+ t2 (172)
=
P ∗ + σ22
P ∗ + σ2Z
(173)
where (173) is obtained by using the definition of t2 given in (168). Equation (173) is
equivalent to
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ22
(174)
which is (44). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
D Proof of Theorem 4
Achievability is clear. We provide the converse proof. To this end, let us fix the distribution∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ) such that
E
[
X2ℓ
]
= Pℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L (175)
and
∑L
ℓ=1 Pℓ ≤ P . We first establish the bound on R2 given in (46). To this end, we start
with (39). Using the Markov chain Uℓ → Y 2kℓ → Zℓ, we have
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ; Y
2
kℓ)− I(Uℓ;Zℓ) (176)
= min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
[
h(Y 2kℓ)− h(Zℓ)
]
+
[
h(Zℓ|U)− h(Y 2kℓ|U)
]
(177)
≤ min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
Pℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
Pℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
+
[
h(Zℓ|U)− h(Y 2kℓ|U)
]
(178)
where (178) comes from the fact that Gaussian Xℓ maximizes
h(Y 2kℓ)− h(Zℓ) (179)
which can be shown via the entropy power inequality [18, 19]. We now use Theorem 3. For
that purpose, we introduce the diagonal covariance matrix Λ∗ which satisfies
Λ1j  Λ∗  Λ2k (180)
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for any (j, k) pair, and in particular, for the diagonal elements of these matrices, we have
Λ1j,ℓℓ ≤ Λ∗ℓℓ ≤ Λ2k,ℓℓ (181)
for any triple (j, k, ℓ). Thus, due to Theorem 3, for any selection of {(Uℓ, Xℓ)}Lℓ=1, there
exists a P ∗ℓ such that
P ∗ℓ ≤ Pℓ (182)
h(Zℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 1jℓ|Uℓ) ≥
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
1
j,ℓℓ
(183)
h(Zℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ) ≤
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
(184)
for any triple (j, k, ℓ). Using (184) in (178), we get
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
Pℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
− 1
2
log
Pℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
(185)
We define P ∗ℓ = βℓPℓ and β¯ℓ = 1− βℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, where βℓ ∈ [0, 1] due to (182). Thus, we
have established the desired bound on R2 given in (46). We now bound R1. We start with
(38). Using the Markov chain (Uℓ, Xℓ)→ Y 1jℓ → Zℓ, we have
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ; Y
1
jℓ|Uℓ)− I(Xℓ;Zℓ|Uℓ) (186)
= min
j=1,...,K1
L∑
ℓ=1
h(Y 1jℓ|Uℓ)− h(Zℓ|Uℓ)−
1
2
log
Λ1j,ℓℓ
ΛZ,ℓℓ
(187)
≤ min
j=1,...,K1
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + Λ
1
j,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + ΛZ,ℓℓ
− 1
2
log
Λ1j,ℓℓ
ΛZ,ℓℓ
(188)
where (188) comes from (183). Since we defined P ∗ℓ = βℓPℓ, (188) is the desired bound on
R1 given in (45), completing the proof.
E Proof of Theorem 6
The main tools for the proof of Theorem 6 are Theorem 5, and the following so-called worst
additive noise lemma [20, 21].
Lemma 4 Let N be a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix Σ, and KX be a
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positive semi-definite matrix. Consider the following optimization problem,
min
p(x)
I(N;N+X) s.t. Cov(X) = KX (189)
where X and N are independent. A Gaussian X is the minimizer of this optimization
problem.
We first bound R2. Assume we fixed the distribution of (U,X) such that Cov(X) = KX .
Then, we have
R2 ≤ I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Z) (190)
= h(Y2)− h(Z) + [h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U)] (191)
≤ 1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|S+ΣZ| + [h(Z|U)− h(Y
2|U)] (192)
To show (192), consider N˜ which is a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix ΣZ −
Σ2, and is independent of (U,X,N2). Thus, we can write
h(Y2)− h(Z) = h(Z|N˜)− h(Z) (193)
= −I(N˜;X+N2 + N˜) (194)
≤ 1
2
log
|KX +Σ2|
|KX +ΣZ | (195)
≤ 1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|S+ΣZ | (196)
where (195) is due to Lemma 4, and (196) follows from the fact that
|A|
|A+B| ≤
|A+∆|
|A+B+∆| (197)
for A  0,B ≻ 0,∆  0 [3, 17].
For the rest of the proof, we need Theorem 5. According to Theorem 5, for any (U,X),
there exists a 0  K  Cov(X|U) such that
h(Z|U)− h(Y2|U) = 1
2
log
|K+ΣZ|
|K+Σ2| (198)
h(Z|U)− h(Y1j |U) ≥
1
2
log
|K+ΣZ |
|K+Σ1j |
, j = 1, . . . , K1 (199)
because Σ1j  Σ2, j = 1, . . . , K1. Using (198) in (192) yields
R2 ≤ 1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2| −
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ | (200)
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which is the desired bound on R2.
The desired bound on R1 can be obtained as follows
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
I(X;Y1j |U)− I(X;Z|U) (201)
= min
j=1,...,K1
h(Y1j |U)− h(Z|U)−
1
2
log
|Σ1j |
|ΣZ| (202)
≤ min
j=1,...,K1
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|K+ΣZ | −
1
2
log
|Σ1j |
|ΣZ| (203)
= min
j=1,...,K1
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+ΣZ|
|ΣZ| (204)
where (203) is due to (199). This completes the proof of Theorem 6.
F Proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 7
F.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The optimization problem in (55) can be put into the following alternative form
max
0KS
a+ µb (205)
s.t. RG1j(K) ≥ a, j = 1, . . . , K1 (206)
RG2k(K) ≥ b, k = 1, . . . , K2 (207)
which has the Lagrangian
L(K) = a + µb+
K1∑
j=1
λ1j
(
RG1j(K)− a
)
+ µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
(
RG2k(K)− b
)
+ tr(KM)
+ tr((S−K)MS) (208)
34
where M and MS are positive semi-definite matrices, and {λ1j}K1j=1 and {λ2k}K2k=1 are non-
negative. The KKT conditions are given by
∂L(K)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=R∗1
= 0 (209)
∂L(K)
∂b
∣∣∣
b=R∗2
= 0 (210)
∇KL(K)|K=K∗ = 0 (211)
λ1j(R
G
1j(K
∗)− R∗1) = 0, j = 1, . . . , K1 (212)
λ2k(R
G
2k(K
∗)− R∗2) = 0, k = 1, . . . , K2 (213)
tr(K∗M) = 0 (214)
tr ((S−K∗)MS) = 0 (215)
The KKT conditions in (209) and (210) yield
∑K1
j=1 λ1j = 1 and
∑K2
k=1 λ2k = 1, respectively.
Furthermore, the KKT conditions in (212) and (213) imply λ1j = 0 when R
G
1j(K
∗) > R∗1
and λ2k = 0 when R
G
2k(K
∗) > R∗2, respectively. The KKT condition in (211) results in
(60). Finally, since tr(AB) = tr(BA) ≥ 0 when A  0 and B  0, we need to have
K∗M =MK∗ = 0 and (S−K∗)MS =MS(S−K∗) = 0.
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F.2 Proof of Theorem 7
Let us fix {λ1j}K1j=1 and {λ2k}K2k=1 as they are defined in Lemma 1. We have
max
0KS
min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K) + µ min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K)
≤ max
(U,X)
min
j=1,...,K1
R1j + µ min
k=1,...,K2
R2k (216)
≤ max
(U,X)
K1∑
j=1
λ1j
[
I(X;Y1j |U)− I(X;Z|U)
]
+ µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
[
I(U ;Y2k)− I(U ;Z)
]
(217)
= max
(U,X)
K1∑
j=1
λ1j
[
h(Y1j |U)− h(Z|U)−
1
2
log
|Σ1j |
|ΣZ |
]
+ µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
[
h(Y2k)− h(Z)
]
− µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
[
h(Y2k|U)− h(Z|U)
]
(218)
≤ max
(U,X)
K1∑
j=1
λ1j
[
h(Y1j |U)− h(Z|U)−
1
2
log
|Σ1j |
|ΣZ|
]
+ µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
1
2
log
|S+Σ2k|
|S+ΣZ |
− µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
[
h(Y2k|U)− h(Z|U)
]
(219)
= max
0KS
K1∑
j=1
λ1j
[
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+ΣZ |
|ΣZ |
]
+ µ
K2∑
k=1
λ2k
[
1
2
log
|S+Σ2k|
|K+Σ2k|
− 1
2
log
|S+ΣZ |
|K+ΣZ |
]
(220)
= max
0KS
min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K) + µ min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K) (221)
where (219) comes from the fact that
h(Y2k)− h(Z) ≤
1
2
log
|S+Σ2k|
|S+ΣZ| , k = 1, . . . , K2 (222)
which is a consequence of the worst additive lemma in Lemma 4, (220) results from Lemma 2,
(221) is due to Lemmas 1 and 2. Thus, we have shown that
max
0KS
min
j=1,...,K1
RG1j(K) + µ min
k=1,...,K2
RG2k(K) = max
(U,X)
min
j=1,...,K1
R1j + µ min
k=1,...,K2
R2k (223)
for µ ≤ 1, which completes the proof of theorem.
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G Proof of Theorem 8
We first show the achievability of the region given in Theorem 8, then provide the converse
proof.
G.1 Achievability
We fix the distribution p(u, x).
Codebook generation:
• Generate 2n(R2+R˜2) length-n u sequences through p(u) = ∏ni=1 p(ui). Consider the
permutation πU on {1, . . . , KZ} such that
I(U ;ZπU (1)) ≤ . . . ≤ I(U ;ZπU (KZ)) (224)
We set R˜2 as
R˜2 = max
t=1,...,KZ
I(U ;Zt) = I(U ;ZπU (KZ )) (225)
We index u sequences as u(w2, w˜21, . . . , w˜2KZ) where w2 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR2}, and w˜2t ∈
{1, . . . , 2nR˜2t}, t = 1, . . . , KZ . R˜2t is given by
R˜2t = I(U ;ZπU (t))− I(U ;ZπU (t−1)), t = 1, . . . , KZ (226)
where we set I(U ;ZπU (0)) = 0. We note that
m∑
t=1
R˜2t = I(U ;ZπU (m)) (227)
and in particular, for m = KZ ,
KZ∑
t=1
R˜2t = I(U ;ZπU (KZ)) = max
t=1,...,KZ
I(U ;Zt) = R˜2 (228)
• For each u, generate 2n(R1+R˜1) length-n x sequences through p(x|u) = ∏ni=1 p(xi|ui).
Consider the permutation πX on {1, . . . , K2} such that
I(X ; Y 2πX(1)|U) ≤ . . . ≤ I(X ; Y 2πX(K2)|U) (229)
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We set R˜1 as
R˜1 = I(X ; Y
2
πX(K2)
|U) = max
k=1,...,K2
I(X ; Y 2k |U) (230)
We index x sequences as x(w1, w˜11, . . . , w˜1K2|w2) where w2 = (w2, w˜21, . . . , w˜2KZ),
w1 ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR1}, and w˜1k ∈ {1, . . . , 2nR˜1k}, k = 1, . . . , K2. R˜1k is given by
R˜1k = I(X ; Y
2
πX(k)
|U)− I(X ; Y 2πX(k−1)|U), k = 1, . . . , K2 (231)
where we set I(X ; Y 2πX(0)|U) = 0. We note that
m∑
k=1
R˜1k = I(X ; Y
2
πX(m)
|U) (232)
and in particular, for m = K2, we have
K2∑
k=1
R˜1k = I(X ; Y
2
πX(K2)
|U) = max
k=1,...,K2
I(X ; Y 2k |U) = R˜1 (233)
Encoding:
If (w1, w2) is the message to be transmitted, we pick {w˜1k}K2k=1 and {w˜2t}KZt=1 independently
and uniformly, and send the corresponding x.
Decoding:
The legitimate users can decode the messages with vanishingly small probability of error,
if the rates satisfy
R1 + R˜1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
I(X ; Y 1j |U) (234)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
I(U ; Y 2k ) (235)
where we used the degradedness of the channel. Plugging the expressions for R˜1 and R˜2
given in (225) and (230), we can get
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
I(X ; Y 1j |U)− I(X ; Y 2k |U) (236)
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
I(U ; Y 2k )− I(U ;Zt) (237)
which is the same as the region given in Theorem 8 because of the degradedness of the
38
channel.
Equivocation computation:
We now show that this coding scheme satisfies the secrecy requirements given in (66) and
(67). We start with (66)
H(W2|ZnπU (t)) = H(W2, ZnπU (t))−H(ZnπU (t)) (238)
= H(W2, Z
n
πU (t)
, Un)−H(Un|W2, ZnπU (t))−H(ZnπU (t)) (239)
= H(Un) +H(W2, Z
n
πU (t)
|Un)−H(Un|W2, ZnπU (t))−H(ZnπU (t)) (240)
≥ H(Un)− I(Un;ZnπU (t))−H(Un|W2, ZnπU (t)) (241)
where we treat each term separately. Since Un can take 2n(R2+R˜2) values uniformly, for the
first term, we have
H(Un) = n(R2 + R˜2) (242)
Following Lemma 8 of [1], the second term in (241) can be bounded as
I(Un;ZnπU (t)) ≤ nI(U ;ZπU (t)) + nǫ2,n (243)
where ǫ2,n →∞ as n→∞. We now consider the third term of (241)
H(Un|W2, ZnπU (t)) ≤ H(Un, W˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ |W2, ZnπU (t)) (244)
≤ H(W˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ) +H(Un|W2, W˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ , ZnπU (t)) (245)
The first term in (245) is
H(W˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ) =
KZ∑
l=t+1
H(W˜2l) (246)
=
KZ∑
l=t+1
nR˜2l (247)
= nI(U ;ZπU (KZ ))− nI(U ;ZπU (t)) (248)
where (246) is due to the independence of {W˜2t}KZt=1, (247) is due to the fact that W˜2t can
take 2nR˜2t values uniformly and independently for t = 1, . . . , KZ , and in (248), we used the
definitions of {R˜2t}KZt=1 given in (226). We next consider the second term in (245). For that
purpose, we note that given
(
W2 = w2, W˜2(t+1) = w˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ = w˜2KZ
)
(249)
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Un can take 2nI(U ;ZpiU (t)) values. Thus, given the side information in (249), the πU (t)th
eavesdropper can decode Un with vanishingly small probability of error, which implies that
H(Un|W2, W˜2(t+1), . . . , W˜2KZ , ZnπU (t)) ≤ nγ2,n (250)
due to Fano’s lemma where γ2,n → 0 as n → ∞. Hence, plugging (248) and (250) in (245)
yields
H(Un|W2, ZnπU (t)) ≤ nI(U ;ZπU (KZ))− nI(U ;ZπU (t)) + nγ2,n (251)
Finally, using (242), (243) and (251) in (241) yields
H(W2|ZnπU (t)) ≥ n(R2 + R˜2)− nǫ2,n − nI(U ;ZπU (KZ))− nγ2,n (252)
= nR2 − n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (253)
where we used (225). Since (253) implies (66), the proposed coding scheme ensures perfect
secrecy for the second group of users.
We now consider the second secrecy requirement given in (67).
H(W1|W2, Y 2,nπX(k)) ≥ H(W1|W2, Y
2,n
πX(k)
, Un) (254)
= H(W1|Y 2,nπX(k), Un) (255)
= H(W1, Y
2,n
πX(k)
|Un)−H(Y 2,n
πX(k)
|Un) (256)
= H(Xn,W1, Y
2,n
πX(k)
|Un)−H(Xn|W1, Y 2,nπX(k), Un)−H(Y
2,n
πX(k)
|Un) (257)
= H(Xn|Un) +H(W1, Y 2,nπX(k)|Un, Xn)−H(Xn|W1, Y
2,n
πX(k)
, Un)
−H(Y 2,n
πX(k)
|Un) (258)
≥ H(Xn|Un)− I(Xn; Y 2,n
πX(k)
|Un)−H(Xn|W1, Y 2,nπX(k), Un) (259)
where (255) is due to the Markov chain W2 → Un → (W1, Y 2,nπX(k)) which originates from the
coding scheme we proposed. Since given Un = un, Xn can take 2n(R1+R˜1) values uniformly
and independently, the first term in (259) is
H(Xn|Un) = n(R1 + R˜1) (260)
Following Lemma 8 of [1], the second term in (259) can be bounded as
I(Xn; Y 2,n
πX(k)
|Un) ≤ nI(X ; Y 2πX(k)|U) + nǫ1,n (261)
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where ǫ1,n → 0 as n→∞. We now consider the third term in (259)
H(Xn|W1, Un, Y 2,nπX(k)) ≤ H(Xn, W˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2|W1, Un, Y
2,n
πX(k)
) (262)
≤ H(W˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2) +H(Xn|W1, Un, Y 2,nπX(k), W˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2)
(263)
where the first term is given by
H(W˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2) =
K2∑
l=k+1
H(W˜1l) (264)
=
K2∑
l=k+1
nR˜1l (265)
= nI(X ; Y 2πX(K2)|U)− nI(X ; Y 2πX(k)|U) (266)
where (264) is due to the independence of {W˜1k}K2k=1, (265) comes from the fact that W˜1k can
take 2nR˜1k values uniformly and independently, and in (266), we used (231). We now bound
the second term of (263). For that purpose, we first note that given
(
Un = un, W1 = w1, W˜1(k+1) = w˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2 = w˜1K2
)
(267)
Xn can take 2
nI(X;Y 2
piX (k)
|U)
values. Thus, given the side information in (267), the πX(k)th
user in the second group can decode Xn with vanishingly small probability of error leading
to
H(Xn|W1, Un, Y 2,nπX(k), W˜1(k+1), . . . , W˜1K2) ≤ nγ1,n (268)
due to Fano’s lemma where γ1,n → 0 as n→∞. Plugging (266) and (268) into (263) yields
H(Xn|W1, Un, Y 2,nπX(k)) ≤ nI(X ; Y 2πX(K2)|U)− nI(X ; Y 2πX(k)|U) + nγ1,n (269)
Finally, using (260), (261) and (269) in (259) results in
H(W1|W2, Y 2,nπX(k)) ≥ nR1 + nR˜1 − nI(X ; Y 2πX(K2)|U)− n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (270)
= nR1 − n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (271)
where we used (230). Since this implies (67), the proposed coding scheme ensures perfect
secrecy for the first group of users, completing the proof.
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G.2 Converse
First, we note that for an arbitrary code achieving the secrecy rate pairs (R1, R2), there exist
(ǫ1,n, ǫ2,n) and (γ1,n, γ2,n) which vanish as n→∞ such that
H(W1|Y 1,nj ) ≤ nǫ1,n, j = 1, . . . , K1 (272)
H(W2|Y 2,nk ) ≤ nǫ2,n, k = 1, . . . , K2 (273)
I(W2;Z
n
t ) ≤ nγ2,n, t = 1, . . . , KZ (274)
I(W1; Y
2,n
k |W2) ≤ nγ1,n, k = 1, . . . , K2 (275)
where (272) and (273) are due to Fano’s lemma, and (274) and (275) come from perfect
secrecy requirements in (66) and (67).
We now define the following auxiliary random variables
Ui =W2Y
∗,i−1Z∗,ni+1, i = 1, . . . , n (276)
which satisfy the Markov chains
Ui → Xi → Y 1j,i → Y ∗i → Y 2k,i → Z∗i → Zt,i, i = 1, . . . , n (277)
for any (j, k, t) triple. The Markov chain in (277) is a consequence of the fact that the
channel is memoryless and degraded.
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We first establish the desired bound on R2 as follows
nR2 = H(W2) (278)
≤ I(W2; Y 2,nk ) + nǫ2,n (279)
≤ I(W2; Y 2,nk )− I(W2;Znt ) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (280)
= I(W2; Y
2,n
k |Znt ) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (281)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Znt , Y 2,i−1k ) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (282)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Znt,i+1, Y 2,i−1k , Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (283)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Znt,i+1, Y
2,i−1
k ,W2; Y
2
k,i|Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (284)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Z∗,ni+1, Y
∗,i−1, Znt,i+1, Y
2,i−1
k ,W2; Y
2
k,i|Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (285)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Z∗,ni+1, Y
∗,i−1,W2; Y 2k,i|Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (286)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Ui; Y
2
k,i|Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (287)
where (281) is due to the Markov chain
W2 → Y 2,nk → Znt (288)
which comes from the fact that the channel is degraded, (283) results from the Markov chain
Z i−1t → Y 2,i−1k → (W2, Y 2k,i, Znt,i) (289)
which is a consequence of the fact that the channel is memoryless and degraded, and (286)
is due to the Markov chain
(Znt,i+1, Y
2,i−1
k )→ (Z∗,ni+1, Y ∗,i−1)→ (W2, Y 2k,i, Zt,i) (290)
which is a consequence of the Markov chain in (2).
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We now establish the bound on R1 as follows
nR1 = H(W1) (291)
= H(W1|W2) (292)
≤ I(W1; Y 1,nj |W2) + nǫ1,n (293)
≤ I(W1; Y 1,nj |W2)− I(W1; Y 2,nk |W2) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (294)
= I(W1; Y
1,n
j |W2, Y 2,nk ) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (295)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Y 2,nk , Y 1,i−1j ) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (296)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (297)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Z∗,ni+1, Y ∗,i−1, Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (298)
=
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (299)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi,W1; Y
1
j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (300)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
1
j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (301)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i)−H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i, Xi)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (302)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2k,i)−H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2k,i, Xi) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (303)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2k,i)−H(Y 1j,i|Ui, Y 2k,i, Xi) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (304)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Xi; Y
1
j,i|Ui, Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (305)
where (295) is due to the Markov chain
(W1,W2)→ Y 1,nj → Y 2,nk (306)
which comes from the degradedness of the channel, (297) results from the Markov chain
Y
2,i−1
k → Y 1,i−1j → (W1,W2, Y 1j,i, Y 2,nk,i ) (307)
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which is again due to the degradedness of the channel, (298) is a consequence of the Markov
chain
(Z∗,ni+1, Y
∗,i−1)→ (Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j )→ (W2,W1, Y 1j,i, Y 2k,i) (308)
which results from the Markov chain in (2), (301) comes from the Markov chain
(Y 2k,i, Y
1
j,i)→ Xi → (W1,W2, Ui, Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 1,i−1j ) (309)
which is due to the fact that the channel is memoryless, (303) is also due to the Markov
chain in (309), and (304) comes from the fact that conditioning cannot increase entropy.
Single-letterization can be accomplished as outlined in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2,
completing the converse proof.
H Proof of Theorem 9
The achievability of the region given in Theorem 9 can be shown by selecting (U,X) =
(U1, X1, . . . , UL, XL) with a joint distribution of the form p(u, x) =
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ). We next
provide the converse proof. To that end, we define the following auxiliary random variables
Uℓ,i =W2Y
∗,i−1Z∗,ni+1Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],iZ
∗
[ℓ+1:L],i, i = 1, . . . , n, ℓ = 1, . . . , L (310)
which satisfy the Markov chains
Uℓ,i → Xℓ,i → Y 1jℓ,i → Y ∗ℓ,i → Y 2kℓ,i → Z∗ℓ,i → Ztℓ,i, i = 1, . . . , n, ℓ = 1, . . . , L (311)
for any (j, k, t) triple. These Markov chains are a consequence of the facts that the channel
is memoryless and degraded, and sub-channels are independent.
We first establish the desired bound on R2. For that purpose, following the proof of
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Theorem 8, we get
nR2 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W2; Y
2
k,i|Y 2,i−1k , Znt,i+1, Zt,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (312)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Y 1,i−1k , Znt,i+1, Zt,i, Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (313)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Y 2,i−1k , Znt,i+1, Zt[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i, Ztℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (314)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Y ∗,i−1, Z∗,ni+1, Z
∗
[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],i, Y
2,i−1
k , Z
n
t,i+1, Zt[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
2
k[1:ℓ−1],i,W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Ztℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (315)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Y ∗,i−1, Z∗,ni+1, Z
∗
[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],i,W2; Y
2
kℓ,i|Ztℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (316)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ,i; Y
2
kℓ,i|Ztℓ,i) + n(ǫ2,n + γ2,n) (317)
where (314) comes from the Markov chain
Zt[1:ℓ−1],i → Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i → (W2, Y 2kℓ,i, Y 2,i−1k , Znt,i+1, Zt[ℓ:L],i) (318)
which is a consequence of the facts that the channel is memoryless and sub-channels are
independent, (316) results from the Markov chain
(Y 2,i−1k , Z
n
t,i+1, Zt[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
2
k[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (Y ∗,i−1, Z∗,ni+1, Z∗[ℓ+1:L],i, Y ∗[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (W2, Y 2kℓ,i, Ztℓ,i)
(319)
which is a consequence of the Markov chain in (10).
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We now bound R1. Following the proof of Theorem 8, we get
nR1 ≤
n∑
i=1
I(W1; Y
1
j,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (320)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k,i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (321)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (322)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (323)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i,W1; Y
1
jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (324)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i; Y
1
jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (325)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i)
−H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i, Xℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (326)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i, Y 2kℓ,i)−H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i, Xℓ,i)
+ n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (327)
≤
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i)−H(Y 1jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i, Xℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (328)
=
n∑
i=1
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ,i; Y
1
jℓ,i|Uℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i) + n(ǫ1,n + γ1,n) (329)
where (322) is due to the Markov chain
Y 2k[1:ℓ−1],i → Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i → (W1,W2, Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ:L],i, Y 1jℓ,i) (330)
which is a consequence of the degradedness of the channel, and the fact that sub-channels
are independent and memoryless, (323) results from the Markov chain
(Y ∗,i−1, Z∗,ni+1, Z
∗
[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
∗
[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (Y 1,i−1j , Y 2,nk,i+1, Y 2k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y 1j[1:ℓ−1],i)→ (W1,W2, Y 1jℓ,i, Y 2kℓ,i)
(331)
which is a consequence of the Markov chain in (10), (325) and (327) come from the Markov
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chain
(W1, Uℓ,i, Y
1,i−1
j , Y
2,n
k,i+1, Y
2
k[ℓ+1:L],i, Y
1
j[1:ℓ−1],i)→ Xℓ,i → (Y 2kℓ,i, Y 1jℓ,i) (332)
which is a consequence of the fact that sub-channels are independent and memoryless.
We can obtain the desired single-letter expressions as it is done in the proof of Theorem 2,
completing the proof.
I Proof of Theorem 10
According to Theorem 3, there exists a P ∗ ≤ P such that
h(X + N˜ |U)− h(X +N∗|U) = 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ˜2
P ∗ + σ2∗
(333)
h(X + N˜ |U)− h(X +N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ˜2
P ∗ + σ22
(334)
h(X + N˜ |U)− h(X +N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ˜2
P ∗ + σ21
(335)
for any (σ21 , σ
2
2) as long as they satisfy
σ21 ≤ σ2∗ ≤ σ22 ≤ σ˜2 (336)
We first show (78). To this end, we note that (333) and (334) imply
h(X +N2|U)− h(X +N∗|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ22
P ∗ + σ2∗
(337)
Furthermore, (333) and (335) imply
h(X +N∗|U)− h(X +N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2∗
P ∗ + σ21
(338)
Combining (337) and (338) yields
h(X +N2|U)− h(X +N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
P ∗ + σ22
P ∗ + σ21
(339)
which is the desired result in (78).
We now show (77). We first note that we can write N˜ as
N˜ = N2 +
√
tN˜Z (340)
where N˜Z is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance σ
2
Z −σ22, and independent
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of (U,X,N2). t in (340) is given by
t =
σ˜2 − σ22
σ2Z − σ22
(341)
where it is clear that t ∈ [0, 1]. We now use Costa’s entropy power inequality [15] to arrive
at (77)
e2h(X+N˜ |U) = e2h(X+N2+
√
tN˜Z |U) (342)
≥ (1− t)e2h(X+N2|U) + te2h(X+NZ |U) (343)
which is equivalent to
e2[h(X+N˜ |U)−h(X+N2|U)] ≥ (1− t) + te2[h(X+NZ |U)−h(X+N2|U)] (344)
which can be written as
h(X +NZ |U)− h(X +N2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
[
1
t
e2[h(X+N˜ |U)−h(X+N2|U)] − 1− t
t
]
(345)
≤ 1
2
log
[
1
t
P ∗ + σ˜2
P ∗ + σ22
− 1− t
t
]
(346)
=
1
2
log
[
P ∗
P ∗ + σ22
− 1
t
σ˜2 − (1− t)σ22
P ∗ + σ22
]
(347)
=
1
2
log
P ∗ + σ2Z
P ∗ + σ22
(348)
where (346) is due to (334) and (348) comes from (341). Since (348) is the desired result in
(77), this completes the proof.
J Proof of Theorem 11
Achievability is clear. We provide the converse proof. We fix the distribution
∏L
ℓ=1 p(uℓ, xℓ)
such that
E
[
X2ℓ
]
= Pℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L (349)
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and
∑L
ℓ=1 Pℓ = P . We first establish the bound on R2 given in (80). To this end, we start
with (73). Using the Markov chain Uℓ → Y 2kℓ → Ztℓ, we have
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Uℓ; Y
2
kℓ)− I(Uℓ;Ztℓ) (350)
= min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
h(Y 2kℓ)− h(Ztℓ) +
[
h(Ztℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ)
]
(351)
≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
Pℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
Pℓ + Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ
+
[
h(Ztℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ)
]
(352)
where (352) comes from the fact that
h(Y 2kℓ)− h(Ztℓ) (353)
is maximized by Gaussian distribution which can be shown by using the entropy power
inequality [18, 19]. We now use Theorem 10. For that purpose, we introduce Λ∗Y and Λ
∗
Z
which satisfy
Λ1j  Λ∗Y  Λ2k  Λ∗Z  ΛZt (354)
for any (j, k, t) triple, and in particular, for the diagonal, elements of these matrices, we have
Λ1j,ℓℓ ≤ Λ∗Y,ℓℓ ≤ Λ2k,ℓℓ ≤ Λ∗Z,ℓℓ ≤ ΛZt,ℓℓ (355)
for any (j, k, t, ℓ). Thus, due to Theorem 10, for any selection of {(Uℓ, Xℓ)}Lℓ=1, we have
P ∗ℓ ≤ Pℓ (356)
h(Ztℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ) ≤
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
(357)
h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 1jℓ|Uℓ) ≥
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
1
j,ℓℓ
(358)
for any (k, j, t, ℓ). Using (357) in (352) yields
R2 ≤ min
k=1,...,K2
t=1,...,KZ
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
Pℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
− 1
2
log
Pℓ + Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
Z
t,ℓℓ
(359)
By defining P ∗ℓ = βℓPℓ and β¯ℓ = 1− βℓ, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, where βℓ ∈ [0, 1] due to (356), we get
the desired bound on R2 given in (80).
We now bound R1. We start with (72). Using the Markov chain Uℓ → Xℓ → Y 1jℓ → Y 2kℓ,
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we have
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ; Y
1
jℓ|Uℓ)− I(Xℓ; Y 2kℓ|Uℓ) (360)
= min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
h(Y 1jℓ|Uℓ)− h(Y 2kℓ|Uℓ)−
1
2
log
Λ1j,ℓℓ
Λ2k,ℓℓ
(361)
≤ min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
P ∗ℓ + Λ
1
j,ℓℓ
P ∗ℓ + Λ
2
k,ℓℓ
− 1
2
log
Λ1j,ℓℓ
Λ2k,ℓℓ
(362)
= min
j=1,...,K1
k=1,...,K2
L∑
ℓ=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
Λ1j,ℓℓ
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
βℓPℓ
Λ2k,ℓℓ
)
(363)
where (362) is due to (358). Since (363) is the desired bound on R1 given in (79), this
completes the proof.
K Background Information for Appendix L
In Appendix L, we need some properties of the Fisher information and the differential en-
tropy, which are provided here.
Definition 1 ([3], Definition 3) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated length-n random
vector pair with well-defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of X given
U is defined as
J(X|U) = E [ρ(X|U)ρ(X|U)⊤] (364)
where the expectation is over the joint density f(u,x), and the conditional score function
ρ(x|u) is
ρ(x|u) = ∇ log f(x|u) =
[
∂ log f(x|u)
∂x1
. . .
∂ log f(x|u)
∂xn
]⊤
(365)
The following lemma will be used in the upcoming proof. In fact, an unconditional
version of this lemma is proved in Lemma 6 of [3].
Lemma 5 Let T,U,V1,V2 be random vectors such that (T,U) and (V1,V2) are indepen-
dent. Moreover, let V1,V2 be Gaussian random vectors with covariances matrices Σ1,Σ2
such that 0 ≺ Σ1  Σ2. Then, we have
J−1(U+V2|T)−Σ2  J−1(U+V1|T)−Σ1 (366)
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The following lemma is also instrumental for the upcoming proof whose proof can be
found in [3].
Lemma 6 ([3], Lemma 8) Let K1,K2 be positive semi-definite matrices satisfying 0 
K1  K2, and f(K) be a matrix-valued function such that f(K)  0 for K1  K  K2.
Then, we have
∫
K2
K1
f(K)dK ≥ 0 (367)
The following generalization of the de Bruin identity [18, 19] is due to [22]. In [22],
the unconditional form of this identity, i.e., the case where U = φ, is proved. However,
its generalization to this conditional form for an arbitrary U is rather straightforward, and
given in Lemma 16 of [3].
Lemma 7 ([3], Lemma 16) Let (U,X) be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair
with finite second order moments, and be independent of the random vector N which is
zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix ΣN ≻ 0. Then, we have
∇ΣNh(X+N|U) =
1
2
J(X+N|U) (368)
L Proof of Theorem 12
According to Theorem 5, for any selection of (U,X), there exists a K∗  S such that
h(X+N∗|U)− h(X+N2|U) = 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ2| (369)
h(X+N∗|U)− h(X+N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ1| (370)
for any Σ1 such that Σ1  Σ2. Furthermore, K∗ satisfies [3]
K∗  J−1(X+N∗|U)−Σ∗ (371)
Equations (369) and (370) already imply
h(X+N2|U)− h(X+N1|U) ≥ 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ2|
|K∗ +Σ1| (372)
for any Σ1 such that Σ1  Σ2, which is the desired inequality in (84).
We now prove (83). For that purpose, we note that (371) implies
K∗  J−1(X+N|U)−ΣN (373)
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for any Gaussian random vector N, independent of (U,X), with covariance matrix ΣN such
that ΣN  Σ∗ because of Lemma 5. The order in (373) is equivalent to
J(X+N|U)  (K∗ +ΣN)−1, Σ∗  ΣN (374)
Now, we can obtain (83) as follows
h(X+NZ |U)− h(X+N2|U) = h(X+NZ|U)− h(X+N∗|U)
+ h(X+N∗|U)− h(X+N2|U) (375)
= h(X+NZ|U)− h(X+N∗|U) + 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ2| (376)
=
1
2
∫
ΣZ
Σ∗
J(X+N|U) dΣN + 1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ2| (377)
≤ 1
2
∫
ΣZ
Σ∗
(K∗ +ΣN)−1dΣN +
1
2
log
|K∗ +Σ∗|
|K∗ +Σ2| (378)
≤ 1
2
log
|K∗ +ΣZ |
|K∗ +Σ2| (379)
where (376) is due to (369), (377) is obtained by using Lemma 7, and (378) comes from
Lemma 6 by noting (374). Since (379) is the desired inequality in (83), this completes the
proof.
M Proof of Theorem 13
We first establish the desired bound on R2 given in (86) as follows
R2 ≤ min
t=1,...,KZ
I(U ;Y2)− I(U ;Zt) (380)
= min
t=1,...,KZ
h(Y2)− h(Zt) +
[
h(Zt|U)− h(Y2|U)
]
(381)
≤ min
t=1,...,KZ
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|S+ΣZt |
+
[
h(Zt|U)− h(Y2|U)
]
(382)
where (380) comes from Theorem 8 by noting the Markov chain U → Y2 → Zt, and (382)
can be obtained by using the worst additive noise lemma, i.e., Lemma 4, as it is done in the
proof of Theorem 6. We now use Theorem 12. According to Theorem 12, for any selection
of (U,X), there exists a positive semi-definite matrix K such that K  S and
h(Zt|U)− h(Y2|U) ≤ 1
2
log
|K+ΣZt |
|K+Σ2| (383)
h(Y2|U)− h(Y1j |U) ≥
1
2
log
|K+Σ2|
|K+Σ1j |
(384)
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for any (j, t) pair. Using (383) in (382) yields
R2 ≤ min
t=1,...,KZ
1
2
log
|S+Σ2|
|K+Σ2| −
1
2
log
|S+ΣZt |
|K+ΣZt |
(385)
which is the desired bound on R2 given in (86).
We now obtain the desired bound on R1 given in (85) as follows
R1 ≤ min
j=1,...,K1
I(X;Y1j |U)− I(X;Y2|U) (386)
= min
j=1,...,K1
h(Y1j |U)− h(Y2|U)−
1
2
log
|Σ1j |
|Σ2| (387)
≤ min
j=1,...,K1
1
2
log
|K+Σ1j |
|Σ1j |
− 1
2
log
|K+Σ2|
|Σ2| (388)
where (386) comes from Theorem 8 by noting the Markov chain U → X → Y1j → Y2 and
(388) is obtained by using (384). Since (388) is the desired bound on R1 given in (85), this
completes the proof.
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